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Abstract  
Business activity can be analyzed through a “risk awareness” perspective and a 
“responsibility awareness” perspective. However, risk and responsibility are actually 
interdependent. Risk‐taking triggers responsibility issues and taking responsibility 
means risking being asked critical questions. This paper suggests some first steps for 
combining these two perspectives conceptually. After several introductory illustrations 
showing how risk and responsibility issues are intertwined, the paper looks separately 
each at risk and at responsibility. Then the argument that such perspectives could be 
usefully combined is elaborated further from a theoretical angle and from a practical 
angle, by looking at various ethical issues and by presenting paradigmatic examples of 
balancing or sharing risk and responsibility related to leadership, to ERM and to 
insurance.  
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This paper is about risk and responsibility, that is, risky responsibilities and responsible 
risks. In everyday language, both words are used frequently and are sufficiently clear to 
most of us, at least as long as we are not asked for very precise definitions. If there is a 
need for clarification, one can always ask experts on risk (such as engineers or doctors) 
or experts on responsibility (such as lawyers or moral philososophers) for their 
definitions and for references to well-respected theories (of course there is always a risk 
of competition among definitions, theories, and experts).  
 This paper suggests we need reflection and dialogue, among lay persons and 
experts, not so much about risk on the one hand and responsibility on the other, but 
about the interdependencies of risk and responsibility questions.1 In the professional 
worlds of  insurance actuaries and insurance lawyers there is a unique mix of thinking 
about risk and responsibility, where risk and responsibility sometimes trigger, and 
sometimes disturb, but mostly support and balance, one another. Ideally, at least, 
insurance represents a “technology” (Ewald, 1991) that is a construction of sustainable 
risk and responsibility sharing in well-designed pools, within clear and well-known 
limits to coverage, maximizing the greatest economic security and care, for the 
greatest number, at the best possible prices. This paper suggests the ideal of risk and 
responsibility sharing in insurance could be used as an inspiration for similar fruitful 
combinations of risk and responsibility thinking elsewhere in business life. That is, we 
could widen the perspective from legal to moral responsibility, from more to less and 
much less predictable and quantifiable risks, and from pricing to additional codes and 
currencies, in order to consider risk-and-responsibility sharing as a new way of 
thinking about business ethics and corporate responsibility.  
 After two introductory illustrations, the key concepts of risk and responsibility 
and their dimensions are elaborated, followed by a presentation of procedures and 
frameworks and finally of selected normative approaches. This elaboration is 
accompanied by another three concrete illustrations, in the realms of  leadership, 
enterprise risk management, and finally insurance. Since this paper aims to provide 
first steps towards creating this combined perspective, the final section points to where 
the next steps might go.  
 
Risk and Responsibility: Illustrations I and II2 
 
The cave rescue exercise. 
“A pot holing expedition has been trapped in an underground cave by a rock fall. The 
expedition leader has reported by field telephone that the cave is flooding at a rate which 
suggests that the cave will be completely flooded within 60-80 minutes, or possibly at 
any time sooner. It will be 20 minutes before the rescue equipment arrives and can be set 
up. Even then it will only be possible to bring out one person every 10 minutes. You are 
                                                 
1 Cf. with a focus on such interdependencies Giddens 1999, Kaufmann 1992 and 1995, Leiss and 
Chociolko 1994 
2 The author has used both stories when teaching business ethics. Other good illustrations are easy to find 
in the intersections of business and environmental ethics or of business ethics and finance.  
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the rescue team and you therefore have 20 minutes in which to decide the order in which 
the (eight) expedition members will be brought to the surface...” 
(www.lsbu.ac.uk/careers/mfe/lec-7/grpexe.html).3 
 
In this first illustration, the best possible order is sought in which to evacuate the 
expedition members, each of whom comes with a short profile. The best case scenario is 
that six out of eight individuals can be rescued; in the worst case perhaps only two can 
be saved. There are risk issues and responsibility issues. Two or more individuals have a 
strong risk of dying, but even more individuals than necessary risk dying if the decision-
makers cannot agree on the criteria for ranking the individuals. The ethical responsibility 
issue involves ranking individuals of equal human worth and dignity. Whatever ranking 
is chosen will mean sentencing some individuals to die, while rescuing some others. 
This introductory example shows that responsibility and risk handling issues can be 
highly interdependent and hard to distinguish clearly from each other, for example, 
proper risk assessment and management on the one hand and fair and responsible 
decisions about risk distribution on the other.  
 
Indecent Proposal? 
In the 1993 movie Indecent Proposal, “… childhood sweethearts David and Diana 
Murphy (played by Woody Harrelson and Demi Moore) are a married couple that travel 
to Las Vegas, hoping they can win enough money to finance David's fantasy real estate 
project. After gambling away all of their savings, they encounter billionaire John Gage 
(played by Robert Redford). John becomes enamoured with Diana...” (source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indecent_Proposal).  
 
The most important scene can be quoted: 
 
David:  [while playing pool] … I guess there's limits to what money can buy. 
John: Not many.  
Diana: Well some things aren't for sale.  
John: Such as?  
Diana: Well you can't buy people.  
John: That's naive, Diana. I buy people every day.  
Diana: In business, maybe, but you can't buy people, not when real emotions are 
involved.  
John: So you're saying you can't buy love? That's a bit of a cliché don't you think?  
Diana: It's absolutely true.  
John: Is it? What do you think?  
David: I agree with Diana.  
John: You do? Well let's test the cliché. Suppose... I were to offer you one million 
dollars for one night with your wife.  
David: I'd assume you're kidding.  
                                                 
3 As original sources see e.g. M. Woodcock, 1979, Team Development Manual, Gower, Aldershot or D. 
Francis and D. Young, 1979, Improving Work Groups... University Associates, San Diego. 
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John: Let's pretend I'm not. What would you say?  
Diana: He'd tell you to go to hell.  
John: I didn't hear him.  
David: I'd tell you to go to hell.  
John: That's a reflex answer because you view the question as hypothetical. But let's 
say that there was real money backing it up. I'm not kidding. A million dollars. 
The night would come and go but the money could last a lifetime. Think of it. A 
million dollars. A lifetime of security... for one night. Don't answer right away. 
Just consider it seriously.  
David: We're positive, okay?  
John: Well then you've proved your point. There are limits to what money can buy... 
(source: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0107211/quotes  ).4   
 
In this second illustration, responsibility and risk approaches are less interdependent, at 
least at first sight. Use of the word “indecent” in the movie title suggests an approach in 
which the responsibility is clear, at least to start with. A hypothetical best friend of the 
couple, asked by them for best advice in such a situation of moral temptation, would 
probably look for a good moral principle as a premise or justification to give responsible 
advice on responsible behavior. Some advisors, or even many, however, might prefer “it 
depends” as an answer. The most likely focus of such a non-principled answer would 
then be not on moral responsibility but on the more pragmatic question of the risk of 
damage versus the opportunity provided by the proposal. In this way of thinking, one 
would, for example, weigh the risk of damaging a good relationship as a consequence of 
such a deal against a risk of marital failure due to money trouble. Of course it is hard to 
give good advice because one cannot possibly know for sure the final outcome 
beforehand, so the choice is between risks that have hopefully been well assessed.5  
Both illustrations suggest that moral dilemmas (such as the cave rescue) and 
temptations (such as the “indecent proposal”) can be phrased in moral responsibility 
terminology, in risk terminology, or in both. Phrasing the questions either in terms of 
risk or responsibility seems straightforward, at least at first, since talk about 
responsibility and risk is familiar from everyday language. At second sight, however, 
risk and responsibility are abstract and complex phenomena; clear definitions are 
necessary but difficult to achieve. One’s primary demand would be for proper 
procedures in order to determine fair responsibility and risk sharing. In order to examine 
such challenges, the paper reviews available concepts and procedures. Then it goes on to 
outline the need for selected normative criteria when working with risk and 
responsibility, theoretically or practically.  
                                                 
4 The story continues as follows: After a difficult night, David and Diana decide to accept the offer, and a 
contract is signed the next day... Although he had hoped to forget the whole incident, David grows 
increasingly insecure about his relationship with Diana, consumed with a fear that she remains involved 
with Gage (ibid.). After this prophecy fulfils itself for a while, some 60 or so movie minutes later, Diana 
returns to David. 
5 One could quote Diana once more, who declares later in the movie, with the wisdom of hindsight: “If 
you ever want something badly, let it go. If it comes back to you, then it's yours forever. If it doesn't, then 
it was never yours to begin with...” (ibid.).  
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Risk and Responsibility: Concepts and Dimensions 
In everyday language most people would associate risks with possibilities or even 
likelihoods of loss or harm. Instead of simply listing a set of synonyms for risk, as one 
finds in dictionaries,6 it may be more fruitful to look for relevant conceptual dimensions 
or aspects of risk which have been emphasized by various authors, often when 
contrasting risk with various antonyms: 
 Measurability of risk (versus non-measurable uncertainty, see Knight, 1921; note 
that risk for this author is not narrowed to negative events, but denotes a chance of 
both winning and losing) 
 Manageability of risk (as possible negative events, which can be managed, i.e. 
prevented, corrected, compensated, versus non-manageable or not-yet-manageable 
dangers, see Evers and Nowotny, 1987) 
 Insurability of risk (versus non-insurability of dangers which are too serious or not 
sufficiently predictable, see Beck, 1993)7 
 Attributability of risk (i.e. risks equal possible losses which can be attributed to a 
decision. These are different from dangers understood as losses which are attributed 
to a system environment, see for such terminology Luhmann, 1993a, pp. 21-22)8 
 Voluntariness of a risk (i.e. whether a stakeholder’s exposure to a given risk is 
chosen by free will and with sufficient knowledge, or assumed involuntarily, or 
somewhere in-between.) 
 Moral responsibility in relation to a risk (versus irresponsibility) ie if risk-taking or 
risk exposure is justified or justifiable because there is informed consent from all 
exposed parties as a result of proper risk dialogue procedures9) 
 
The paper will return to most of these questions in the following sections, especially the 
final one, if and how it is possible to take moral responsibility for a risk,10 and under 
what circumstances. A quick reference to insurance might be helpful at this point. If a 
risk is deemed insurable, this means that an insurance company accepts a transfer of 
both risk and responsibility for compensation for losses. The development of an 
                                                 
6 The Merriam Webster Dictionary provides the following synonyms of risk:  
“... possibility of loss or injury, peril; someone or something that creates or suggests a hazard; the chance 
of loss or the perils to the subject matter of an insurance contract; also: the degree of probability of such 
loss; a person or thing that is a specified hazard to an insurer; an insurance hazard from a specified cause 
or source; the chance that an investment ... will lose value...” (http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Risk ) 
7 Beck uses as a metaphor the inadequacy of bike brakes for stopping intercontinental jet planes (1993, p. 
915). As a newer source in English see e.g. Beck 2006. 
8 Another and perhaps more fruitful terminological distinction could be between an actor’s or one-decision 
or micro-level risks, and systemic or macro-level risks, cf. e.g. Renn, 2008, pp. 61-66 et passim. 
9 Cf e.g. the work of the Swiss risk dialogue foundation,  http://www.risiko-
dialog.ch/Overview%20in%20English  
10 Note for readers with a sense of linguistic subtleties: The German term Verantwortbarkeit refers 
literally to a possibility or ability for something to be taken responsibility for, and implies an upper limit to 
which one can or should take responsibility for a risk. This subtlety is not easy to translate into English, 
even if the idea seems to involve an understanding of responsibility as an ability to respond (no ability, no 
responses, no responsibility, no Verantwortbarkeit). 
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insurance product typically presupposes measurablity of covered risks, while other 
aspects of the risks are evaluated depending on the insurance type, such as attributability 
or involuntariness of risks and damages. With this in mind, we can now take a look at 
various meanings and aspects of responsibility. 
 In everyday language, responsibility is something nice as long as it is kept vague, 
and something potentially threatening once it is clarified and in the format of falsifiable 
expectations. If one wants to clarify what we mean by “responsibility” by presenting a 
number of synonyms, one realizes that responsibility can denote an actor obligation, 
such as “moral, legal, or mental accountability”, and a positive property of actors such 
as “reliability or trustworthiness”, but also a reference, that is “something for which one 
is responsible: burden...” (inspired by http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/responsibility ). And one can, as in the paragraphs about risk 
above, look at various aspects of responsibility (see Brinkmann, 2007, pp. 89-91), such 
as: 
• Initiative: Taken versus ascribed responsibility (i.e. self-obligation versus attribution 
of responsibility by external norm systems or subjects) 
• Time focus: Ex-ante versus ex-post responsibility (i.e. proactiveness versus potential 
blaming afterwards)11 
• Specification: Vague versus specified responsibility (i.e. non-programmable versus 
limited and clearly role-bound responsibility) 
• System level: Insider-view versus outsider-view responsibility (i.e. defined 
internally, e.g. in a system, versus looking from outside)12 
• Subject number: Sole versus shared responsibility (i.e. number of responsible 
subjects). 
Also this list can be extended in accordance with the focus of the present article, by 
adding a sixth aspect of responsibility, namely: 
 
 Riskiness: Possibility times seriousness of responsibility, equal to the possibility 
times seriousness of accountability and liability claims faced, as a consequence of 
taken or ascribed responsibility. 
 
In the context of this article, the last mentioned aspect of responsibility is of primary 
interest, sometimes in combination with other aspects of responsibility. After all, 
responsibility denotes a risk of owing answers to questions, where questions and 
answers may vary - by difficulty, avoidability, forwardability, rewards and punishments 
and so on. For an illustration one can think once more of risky and hopefully responsible 
decisions about whom to rescue, or of responsible advice as an outsider to couples 
considering indecent or risky proposals. In the context of a business ethics paper, 
another thought-provoking example could be limited liability corporations, where such 
limiting of responsibility represents a necessary condition for risk taking, while 
                                                 
11 Add. 2012: Cf also Enderle 2006, referring to W. Schulz' Philosophie in ver veränderten Welt, 
Pfullingen 1972  
12 Cf also the initiative dimension mentioned above; cf for the source Brinkmann, 2007, p. 89, 
summarising points made by Bierhoff in Bayertz’ anthology, 1995. 
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irresponsible risk taking can be reduced by increasing responsibility in terms of legal 
liability for the consequences of such risk taking.13  Still another illustration is the 
historical development of liability insurance and liability law, with similar business -
enabling effects, as coverage for risky responsibility and responsibility risks, normally 
with fine print provisions about irresponsible, unacceptable risks (see Munich Re, 2007). 
 
Risk and Responsibility: Procedures and Frameworks 
In the tradition of empirical research tied to consultancy, operational definitions, 
procedures and checklists are of primary interest, as opposed to a slow and in-depth 
examination of theoretical concepts. Understanding the world seems less interesting than 
changing it, concept clarification (assuming that concept clarity is satisfactory) seems 
less interesting than the questions of what one should do, and which questions one 
should ask and address in which order (often not independently of how interesting the 
questions and answers are to a client).14 However, as long as one sees the danger of 
conceptual shallowness, even rather simple checklists for risk and responsibility 
handling can be useful, legitimate or at least inspiring for project planning. 
Given the potential demand for business risk management help and checklists, the 
overwhelming supply of such checklists and models is not a surprise. There are a 
number of largely self-explanatory options (eg http://www.fda.gov/ucm/groups/fdagov-
public/documents/image/ucm128056.jpg or 
http://www.demc.nsw.gov.au/images/Monito7.gif 15. See also the widely quoted 
consultancy leaflet which presents the COSO 2004 framework, with its eight steps or 
“components” to be checked (COSO, 2004, p. 10, shortened by present author): 
 Internal Environment (organizational risk perception climate) 
 Objective Setting  
 Event Identification (Internal and external events which affect objective 
achievement, as risks and opportunities). 
 Risk Assessment (by likelihood and impact) 
 Risk Response (such as avoiding, accepting, reducing, or sharing risk, in accordance 
with the entity’s risk tolerances and risk appetite). 
 Control Activities (procedures for ensuring effective risk response implementation) 
 Information and Communication (relevant information is communicated for enabling 
target groups to carry out their responsibilities). 
                                                 
13 See in particular what lawyers in different jurisdictions call risk liability, no-fault or strict liability, or in 
German Gefährdungshaftung, liability for damages occurring as an extension of permitted risk taking and 
risk exposure, independently of fault (http://home.iprimus.com.au/than/toby/Risk_Liability.pdf, 
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gef%C3%A4hrdungshaftung, http://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/No-fault+liability, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-fault_insurance)  
14 See e.g. as one example among many: http://www.risk-management-basics.com/risk-management-risk-
question.shtml or see simply the results of a quick google image search: 
http://images.google.no/images?hl=en&rlz=1T4GPEA_enNO295NO295&um=1&sa=1&q=risk+manage
ment+process&btnG=Search&aq=f&oq=&start=0  
15 For many more visualizations see 
http://images.google.no/images?um=1&hl=en&rlz=1T4GPEA_enNO295NO295&q=risk+management+m
odel&btnG=Search+Images 
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 Monitoring (so that the entire enterprise risk management can be modified as 
necessary). 
 
In the context of this paper, a basic delineation of four risk management steps or 
presented in a table format is most suitable (see exhibit #1). This serves as a contrast to 
the more complex framework for more complex contexts by O. Renn presented below.16  
 
Risk-related task17 Task description Increasing an awareness of ethical 
responsibility18 (and inviting people to 
take it) 
Risk definition  Identification of risk 
sources, threats, possible 
events 
 
Moral intensity of risk definitions, i.e. 
sources, threats, events; moral and 
reputational vulnerability; specific 
stakeholders as source of potential 
moral criticism. 
Risk evaluation 
 
Evaluating risk as severity 
of loss times likelihood of 
occurrence, for proper 
prioritizing 
 
Make sure to include ethical 
acceptability as an evaluation 
criterion, as well as specific moral and 
reputational risks by likelihood and 
seriousness, both as interesting in 
themselves and as a reflex of other 
risks 
Risk control and 
financing 
 
Select and perhaps mix 
alternatives such as 
tolerate-treat-terminate-
transfer (or accept-control-
avoid-transfer; or 
avoidance-reduction-
retention-transfer) 
Moral and reputational risk control as 
an end in itself and as insurance for 
other kinds of crises. Prevention of 
and preparation for routine and for 
worst case scenarios by ethical 
climate development, ethical codes, 
training and other tools.  
Risk- related decision-
making 
 
Formulation, 
implementation and 
evaluation of a risk 
management plan, decision 
monitoring and control 
Explicit inclusion of moral risk 
aspects, moral and reputational risk, 
both as a primary and as a secondary 
risk. Consider developing relevant 
tools. 
Exhibit #1: Risk management as management of risk-related tasks  
 
Exhibit #1 is constructed and filled in with a risk manager or lecturer in risk 
management in mind. The main point is an invitation to widen standard procedure, that 
is, to include an ethics and responsibility dimension in each of the stages. The “ethical 
                                                 
16 On a very general and abstract level, many risk managment schemes look like the one presented in 
exhibit #1. Cf most generally http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/risk_management or more specifically, e.g. 
from a consultancy angle, both as one of the most general USPs and promises 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/risk-management/index.jhtml or http://www.dnv.com/focus/risk_management/  
17 This exhibit re-uses more general standard terminology, but a quick translation to Renn’s terminology 
in exhibit #2 below is possible if desirable, from risk definition to his pre-assessment and appraisal, from 
risk evaluation to his mix of risk characterization and evaluation, from risk control and financing to 
Renn’s somewhat narrow option identification, assessment, evaluation and selection and of risk- related 
decision-making to his implementation with sub-processes 
18 Surprisingly, neither risk-related activities nor HSE-risks are normally dealt with in business ethics 
textbooks. See as an exception DeGeorge, 2006, pp. 279-282, but confined to HSE risks.  
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awareness” column in the exhibit includes examples of additional points to consider, 
perhaps additional tasks to be carried out. Inspired by an article by Jones (1991), one can 
think of “moral intensity” as an aspect when defining risk as a potential “moral issue”.19 
In a risk management perspective many, perhaps most, ethical issues present themselves 
as reputational risks, 20 that is, they represent, the possibility of a seriously worsened 
public reputation, which needs to be addressed in the evaluation, control and decision 
making stages.  
Ortwin Renn’s book Risk Governance (2008) presents a systematic framework 
which because of its broad theory-base is legitimate in the world of interdisciplinary 
academic risk research. It is also used in the world of consulting and policy planning, by 
the International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) of which Renn is a council member. 
According to its website, the IRGC 
“… is an independent organisation whose purpose is to help the understanding and 
management of emerging global risks that have impacts on human health and safety, the 
environment, the economy and society at large. IRGC’s work includes developing 
concepts of risk governance, anticipating major risk issues and providing risk 
governance policy recommendations for key decision makers. 
IRGC focuses on emerging, systemic risks for which governance deficits exist and 
aims to provide recommendations for how policy makers can correct them...  Many of 
these risks are complex, uncertain, or even ambiguous. In most cases, the potential 
benefits and negative side-effects interconnect...” 
Like the analogous term “corporate governance”, the key term of “risk governance” 
has a connotation of holistic and participatory decision-making about risks.21  Exhibit #2 
(source: Renn, 2008, p. 365)22 is at the same time intended as a summary of the author’s 
whole book and as a model of a process with “four consecutive phases called pre-
assessment, appraisal, characterization/evaluation and management. In addition, risk 
communication accompanies all four phases.” Renn’s ambition is to include traditional 
risk analysis and risk management but also to move it into “matters of institutional 
design... on the part of public bodies... and private enterprises” (p. 364). Even if there is 
                                                 
19 Jones’ (descriptive) points of departure are indicators or “components” of moral intensity: magnitude of 
consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity and concentration 
of effect, which alone and jointly increase the likelihood of an issue being  recognized as a moral issue 
(see 1991, pp. 374-378, 380-383).  
20 Cf. Rossouw and van Vuuren, 2004, with an emphasis of the reputation risk aspect of ethical risks (in 
fact understood as a threat-opportunity range rather than as negative risk only), see especially their table 
on p. 203 (using various stakeholders as sources of potentially risky reputation relationships). Cf also as 
an academic paper Fombrun et al, 2000 and the inspiring Economist-report about “reputation as the risk of 
risks”, http://www.acelimited.com/NR/rdonlyres/2B964DD5-F93E-47C3-BA44-
999A0BAEAD40/0/RISK_REPUTATION_REPORT.pdf  
21 For a presentation see the same website: “Risk governance applies the principles of good governance to 
the identification, assessment, management and communication of risks in a broad sense. It incorporates 
such criteria as accountability, participation and transparency within the procedures and structures by 
which risk-related decisions are made and implemented. Risk governance includes the totality of actors, 
rules, conventions, processes and mechanisms and is concerned with how relevant risk information is 
collected, analysed and communicated, and how management decisions are taken. Global risks are not 
confined to national borders; they cannot be managed through the actions of a single sector. The 
governance of global, systemic risks requires cohesion between countries and the inclusion within the 
process of government, industry, academia and civil society…” (source: http://www.irgc.org/) 
22 Renn’s figure 10.1 in Renn, 2008; cf. also e.g. the same figure in a simplified format as figure 2.1, also 
figures 5.4 and 9.1 
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no explicit reference to “responsibility” or to “ethics” in the index of Renn’s book, 
several components of his risk governance framework do address the responsibility issue 
implicitly. Renn’s problem framing could easily be extended to include what has been 
called “moral intensity” (Jones, 1991).23 Risk perception implies various intervening 
factors such as value commitments (p. 119 f.), cultural-ethical elements (see e.g. p. 122) 
and not least trust and credibility (p. 123 f.). Risk tolerability and acceptability 
judgements as well as option evaluation under risk management use obviously ethical 
criteria (such as fairness, ethical acceptability, accountability, cf. pp. 147 ff, 177, 223). 
Risk communication has credibility as a key component (cf. p. 226), while risk 
participation can be seen as a way of responsibility sharing among all stakeholders. 
Most clearly, however, the responsibility and ethics dimension is represented in the risk 
characterization and evaluation stage or framework component, especially if and when 
the evaluation of risk “tolerability” and “acceptability” is “disputed” (Renn’s label for 
such a situation is “normative ambiguity”, see esp. p. 153). 
 
 
Exhibit #2 (IRGC, 2007, p. 13; also used in Renn, 2008, p. 365). 
Used with IRGC’s permission. 
                                                 
23 Jones’ definition of moral intensity: “A construct that captures the extent of issue-related moral 
imperative in a situation. It is multidimensional, and its component parts are characteristics of the moral 
issue such as magnitude of consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, 
proximity, and concentration of effect…” (1991, p. 372, present author’s italics).  
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A similar checklist for analyzing relationships of responsibility can also be 
developed from a “relational” definition of responsibility formulated by Lenk and 
Maring (1993), who look at responsibility as a mixture of interdependent components:  
“Someone (a subject with or bearer of responsibility) is responsible for something 
(actions, action consequences, states, tasks etc.) in relation to an addressee and towards 
a (sanctioning, judging) institution, according to a (prescriptive, normative) criterion, in 
the context of a given responsibility and action domain…” (1993, p. 229, present 
author’s translation).24  
If one tries to rephrase the authors’ responsibility components into a sequence of sub-
questions and then tries to elaborate these further, one ends up with a table such as 
exhibit #3.  This exhibit is constructed and filled in in a similar fashion as exhibit #1, but 
this time with a business ethics or corporate responsibility practitioner or teacher in 
mind, inviting her or him to include and to address risks and riskiness explicitly.  
One can try to explain exhibit #3 in prose: The “risk awareness” column includes 
risks to consider, as additional points, when examining an organisation’s or an 
individual’s responsibility. It is important to make sure that one does not overlook risk-
related tasks of the kind described above. In line with what has been said earlier: bearing 
responsibility as an individual or as an organization (who), by voluntary choice or by 
ascription, can be more risky than one is aware of. There is often a risk of unintended 
negative consequences of good intentions - such as disappointment of unrealistic 
expectations after one has volunteered to take the industry lead in corporate societal 
responsibility; in other words, responsibility-taking can imply risk-taking, and should in 
such a case include some risk management.  Once one accepts such advice, other risk-
related tasks follow, almost automatically. And there can be a responsibility for risks, 
more specifically for risk acceptability and for risk management. Furthermore, 
responsibility is always a question of creating and communicating expectations, i.e. 
meeting and frustrating, negotiating and modifying risky and perhaps conflicting 
expectations, rights and duties towards stakeholders and reference groups. In this 
respect, processes of risk analysis and risk management need to look at and listen to 
questions from these actors and understand their expectations and frustrations, being 
aware there are varying degrees of likelihood, seriousness, realism and so on.  In a risk 
management perspective it is also important to clarify the norms and norm types which 
                                                 
24 Cf. also in a more ordinary sentence format: “Responsibility is to start with a concept which is expressed 
in a relational ascription norm by an evaluation of a controlled action expectation” (ibid.). Cf. also a 
similar definition of Lenk, quoted in Bayertz, 1995, p. 217, similarly Nunner-Winkler (1993) or as a 
“visualized” checklist Ulrich and Thielemann, 1992, p. 18. 
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Responsibility aspects Extended description,  
some abstract examples 
Increasing risk awareness and 
considering risk-related questions and 
tasks 
Who has responsibility 
(is ascribed and/or 
takes responsibility)? 
Individuals, groups, 
whole organizations, 
analyzed as subjects or 
actors with roles, 
functions, power (alone or 
shared or sharable, cf 
below) 
Is the status of being the responsible 
subject generally risky? Is the 
responsible subject always per se a 
potential risk-taker and risk-manager?  
Responsibility for 
what: which events, 
states, actions, 
decisions, past and/or 
future ones, and their 
foreseeable/ non-
foreseeable 
consequences? 
Responsibility for 
producing desirable and 
avoiding harmful 
consequences (by 
performing main 
functions) 
Is there a responsibility “for risks” and 
for “risk acceptability” as well as for 
sufficient “risk management”?  
Responsibility towards 
whom: which 
stakeholders, 
observers, judges? 
Responsibility typically 
refers to a relation 
between actors with 
complementary rights and 
duties 
Responsibility towards someone means 
risking to be asked questions by this 
someone: Which questions, expectations 
and frustrations are most risky, from 
which stakeholders and judges, with 
how risky reactions when being 
disappointed? 
Responsibility 
according to which 
norms? 
Relevant legal, soft-law 
and moral norms, vague 
trust and expectations 
Which norms or norm types define one’s 
responsibility? How likely are  sanctions 
and how serious are the sanctions? Are 
there any modifying conditions such as 
burden of proof issues and/or potential 
excuses? 
Is there any shared or 
sharable 
responsibility? 
E.g. by democratic 
participation, both 
through formal bodies and 
via informal channels 
Is there a best way, a golden mean of 
sharing responsibility for risks, where 
sharing neither reduces responsibility 
nor increases risks? 
Exhibit #3: Probing for responsibility aspects 
 
constitute one’s responsibility. Norms are usually defined by reactions to breaches, 
reactions that are both relatively likely to occur and relatively serious. Among the whole 
range of norm types, positive law norms, risks and sanctions are typically more codified, 
specified and predictable, not least because there are professional norm specialists. On 
the other side of an assumed continuum one finds less institutionalised norm types, such 
as normative expectations which are defined by a risk of disappointment, e.g. 
stakeholder or market trust, and perhaps by risks of economic punishment. Unless 
responsibility is shared already, responsibility sharing with others can represent a good 
reflex after being ascribed or after taking responsibility. The important follow-up 
question before or after such sharing is of course whether it is productive or risky if risk 
or responsibility increase or decrease.  
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The common denominator of exhibits #1 and #3 (and to some extent #2) is to 
show how easily and almost unavoidably risk management triggers responsibility issues 
and to show how risky responsibility relations are, whether one’s point of departure is 
the responsible subject, the responsibility domain, the affected parties, any constitutive 
norms or unintended effects of responsibility sharing. Rather than adding another 
checklist or table on top of the previous ones, references to leadership texts and theories 
will now be used for suggesting next steps in trying out syntheses of risk and 
responsibility. 
 
Risk and responsibility: Illustration III 
More or less widely used definitions of leadership focus on core criteria such as 
influence towards followers qua role modeling, inspiration, the formulation, sharing and 
realization of visions, and expectation conflict management.25 Hopefully, such 
leadership is responsible (cf. Maak and Pless, 2006) and ethical (cf Ciulla, 2004 or 
Wicks et al., 2010, pp. 149-154),26 for example in the meaning of accountability to the 
whole range of affected stakeholders, and in the meaning of reliability, as a positive 
personality trait that in turn creates trustworthiness. In accordance with the title of this 
paper, it feels tempting to suggest willingness and ability to take, to share and perhaps to 
balance risk and responsibility as a key defining criterion of leadership (in line with 
Huntsman’s three Rs of leadership: risk, reponsibility and reliability, see Huntsman 
2005, p. 47): 27  
“Leadership is about taking risks. If your life is free of failure, you aren’t much of a 
leader. Take no risks and you risk more than ever. Leaders are called on to enter areas 
where success isn’t covered by the warranty, where public failure is a real possibility. 
It’s a scary scenario… The chance of making mistakes increases dramatically with 
leadership…, never having failed is never having led. To succeed, we must attempt new 
things… Mistakes are not the problem. How one identifies and corrects errors, how one 
turns failure into a new opportunity, determines the quality and durability of 
leadership… Mistakes and miscues are often transformed into meaningful, successful 
experiences… ‘ Good judgment comes from experience, and experience comes from 
poor judgment…” (ibid., pp. 53-55). 
                                                 
25 Cf e.g. In its essence, leadership in an organizational role involves (1) establishing a clear vision, (2) 
sharing (communicating) that vision with others so that they will follow willingly, (3) providing the 
information, knowledge, and methods to realize that vision, and (4) coordinating and balancing the 
conflicting interests of all members or stakeholders. A leader comes to the forefront in case of crisis, and 
is able to think and act in creative ways in difficult situations. Unlike management, leadership flows from 
the core of a personality and cannot be taught, although it may be learned and may be enhanced through 
coaching or mentoring (source: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/leadership.html) or as the 
“process of social influence in which one person can enlist the aid and support of others in the 
accomplishment of a common task”, or as “creating a way for people to contribute to making something 
extraordinary happen.” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Leadership).  
26 Cf. also Sims and Brinkmann (2002 and 2003) who use Schein’s focus on leadership as a critical 
component of the organization’s culture, by in fact creating, maintaining, or changing it, including its 
ethicalness, in accordance with for example Ch. I. Barnard’s executive role description as the creator of 
“morals for others” (1938, quoted by Sims and Brinkmann, 2002). More specifically, Schein looks at 
various mechanisms or ingredients of leadership styles which do or which can influence an organization’s 
ethical climate, such as attention focus, reaction to crises and role modeling (cf. ibid.).  
27 There exists also a textbook by C.L. Brungardt, 1999, Risk leadership - the courage to confront & 
challenge,  Rocky Mountain Press , Longmont, Co.  
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As a more classical source one can refer briefly to sociologist Max Weber’s widely 
referenced formulations about responsibility ethics.28 Even if Weber does not address 
risk explicitly, his thoughts can inspire further reflection about the riskiness of 
responsibility and about responsibility for risk-taking. Weber’s point of departure is, on 
the one hand, the question of legitimacy of power, or more specifically of a powerful 
decision-maker (Weber, 1994),29 and, on the other hand, his constructive criticism of 
voluntarist ethics from a consequentialist position.30 Risk awareness and responsible risk 
handling are the implicit core of Weber’s so-called ethic of responsibility, mainly 
addressing the question of risking unwilled and morally disputable side-effects.31 For 
Weber, a good politician (or better, one might add, any leader or powerful decision-
maker) has involvement, responsibility awareness, and judgement, or in Weber’s own 
words, Verantwortungsethik as a frame of reference rather than Gesinnungsethik. Wise 
and detached analysis of consequences should always come first, ”as a duty”, and 
include an analysis of possible unintended side-effects.  
 
Risk and Responsibility: Risk Ethical Perspectives 
Similar to shadows, responsibility questions and issues in relation to risks are almost 
impossible to avoid. Not surprisingly, such responsibility connotations of risks have 
been ubiquitous on the previous pages, implicitly and now and then explicitly.  This 
section takes a closer and more systematic look at the core criteria of such normative 
connotations of risk, of attributions and evaluations (and at their risks, too).32 In terms of 
                                                 
28 Max Weber’s classical essay Politik als Beruf (1919, English translation 1994) can be read in various 
ways: as a criticism of voluntarism, as a criticism of emphasizing good or evil intentions at the expense of 
good or evil consequences, as a practical elaboration of consequentialism and as a kind of virtue ethics, 
elaborating positive personal properties of good decision-makers in political (and similar) contexts. 
29 Cf at least a few quotations: ”The question facing such a person … is which qualities will enable him 
to do justice to this power ... and thus to the responsibility it imposes on him... Three qualities are pre-
eminently decisive for a politician: passion, a sense of responsibility, judgement (Weber clarifies these 
properties also by their contrary: vanity, power focus, lack of distance, ibid.). 
30 Cf. ibid. ”... Ethically oriented activity can follow two fundamentally different, irreconcilably opposed 
maxims. It can follow the ’ethic of principled conviction’ (Gesinnungsethik) or the ’ethic of responsibility’ 
(Verantwortungsethik, author’s add.). It is not that the ethic of conviction is identical with irresponsibility, 
nor that the ethic of responsibility means the absence of principled conviction... But there is a profound 
opposition between acting by the maxim of the ethic of conviction … and acting by the maxim of the ethic 
of responsibility, which means that one must answer for the (foreseeable) consequences of one’s 
actions...” (pp. 359-360)  
31 Cf.: ”A man who subscribes to the ethic of responsibility... will make allowances for ... everyday 
shortcomings in people... He does not feel that he can shuffle off the consequences of his own actions, as 
far as he could foresee them, and place the burden on the shoulders of others. He will say, ’These 
consequences are to attributed to my actions’... No ethics in the world can get around the fact that the 
achievement of ’good’ ends is in many cases tied to the necessity of employing morally suspect or at least 
morally dangerous means, and that one must reckon with the possibility or even likelihood of evil side-
effects.’’ (p. 360). 
32 For sceptical remarks cf Luhmann, 1993a and 1993b, with the advice that one should make sure that a 
normative focus on risk issues does not further prejudice instead of good judgment, and also make sure 
that such a focus does not replace humbleness and good questions with premature answers. 
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the previous procedures and frameworks section, one could say that such risk ethics33 
refers to the risk evaluation task or “stage” within risk management (cf exhibit #2 above) 
or that risk ethics represents a ubiquitous core of “holistic” risk governance, together 
with risk communication (cf exhibit #1 above). Independently of such practical 
placement in checklists, risk ethics reproduces the general choice of typical primary 
evaluation criteria as one finds them in the most prominent moral philosophical 
approaches34 and then applies these criteria to risk issues. 
 
Principles as criteria 
The first intuitive reflex answer for most lay judges of risky situations is perhaps a 
negative version of the key utilitarian criterion: minimizing the (net) harm for the 
greatest number of potential victims. The risk experts’ standard definition of risk equal 
frequency times seriousness of consequences suggests a similar reflex, with some kind 
of utilitarianism either as the premise of such a definition or as a natural next step. In 
spite of such a prima facie fit, the well-known weaknesses of utilitarianism apply, 
together with its equally well-known strengths. Some kind of rule-utilitarianism35 or 
some adjustments36 can counter a criticism of its weaknesses, but also weaken its main 
strengths, not least its closeness to engineering and economics risk experts’ preferences 
for being able to compute most acceptable or most tolerable solutions, rather than being 
forced to justify them in prose. 
Criteria such as societal inequality of risk exposure, risks of irreversible risk 
misjudgement, or transparency of risks to potential victims can be used for a 
constructive criticism of problematic utilitarian assumptions, either for rejecting them or 
for softening them. The maximin criterion for example suggests an over-proportionate 
effort to avoid low likelihood catastrophes. The difference principle supports positive 
discrimination towards the poorest and most vulnerable populations (Rawls, 1971, pp. 
302-303).37 The precautionary principle (which is widely used in environmental 
politics38) suggests risking the pessimists’ error I rather than the optimists’ error II. In 
other words, when it comes to environmental risks (and similar size other risks), the 
                                                 
33 Including ethics of/and risk as alternative labels and keywords. Cf e.g. Hansson, 2003, Nida-Rümelin, 
2005; Rath, 2008, and in addition J. E. J. Altham, Ethics of Risk, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
New Series, Vol. 84, (1983 - 1984), pp. 15-29, http://kenan.ethics.duke.edu/the-ethics-of-risk/  
34 Cf e.g. as one example among many the distinctions of approaches used in the Crane and Matten (2010) 
textbook (chs 3 and 4) which could serve as a fruitful preliminary content organizer for both business and 
risk ethical approaches. 
35 See various widely-quoted articles of J.C. Harsanyi, such as ‘Rule utilitarianism and decision theory’ 
(Erkenntnis, 1977) or ‘Bayesian decision theory and utilitarian ethics’ (The American Economic Review, 
1978), or as secondary literature Shrader-Frechette, 1991, esp. chapter 8, Hansson, 2004, Rath, 2008, pp 
63-88, Nida-Rümelin’s contribution in Pieper, 1992, esp. pp. 160-163 
36 Cf the Hurwitz criterion where best case and worst case scenarios are weighed, cf. Elemente…, 2006, 
note 9. 
37 Cf in addition to Rawls, 1971, Rawls, 1974, Harsanyi, 1975 Rath, 2008, pp 88-112  
38 Cf the Rio summit principle #15 http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm): 
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by states 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full 
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation…” About what could call “future ethics” cf e.g. Ott 2003 with further 
references. 
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burden of scientific proof rests with the party suggesting taking a risky action.39 As a 
fourth example, the principle of informed consent is mainly used in medical and 
psychological treatment and research contexts.40 This criterion can be generalized, too, 
arguing that potential risk victims have a right to know, to be informed, to say no or to 
accept a risk, voluntarily, and by such consent, to make it acceptable.41  
Such principles as criteria can be inspiring and useful as shorthand formulations, 
especially as long as a “satisfactory solution” is still missing (Hansson, 2007). After 
examining utilitarian, rights-, duty- and contract-based moral theories, Hansson 
concludes with the following skeptical but constructive remarks (quotation shortened by 
present author):  
“In summary, the problem of appraising risks from a moral point of view does not seem 
to have any satisfactory solution in established moral theories. The following are three 
possible elements of a solution: 1) It may be useful to shift the focus from risks… to 
actions of risk-taking and risk-imposing…  2) … (Let us assume) that each person has a 
prima facie moral right not to be exposed to risk of negative impact… through the 
actions of others... that has to be overridden in quite a few cases, in order to make social 
life at all possible… (and that) gives rise to what can be called an exemption problem, 
namely the problem of determining when it is rightfully overridden… 3) Part of the 
solution to the exemption problem may be obtained by allowing for reciprocal 
exchanges of risks and benefits. Exposure of a person to a risk can then be regarded as 
acceptable if it is part of an equitable social system of risk-taking that works to her 
advantage…” (Hansson, 2007) 
 
In addition to Hansson’s suggestion to focus on risky actions, on justified unavoidability 
and on benefits of risks, one could also try the two positions which are presented in the 
following two paragraphs, which suggest focusing on good communication and on good 
characters respectively.  
 
Good information and good communication as criteria 
The criterion of informed consent which was mentioned briefly above 
automatically raises further questions about what is reliable, relevant and understandable 
information about given risks. Still another question that follows is the availability of 
such information to parties who need it, because they are exposed to a risk or because 
they are considering taking a risk (such as taking medication with the risk of possible 
side effects or buying financial products that involve risk). A final question, perhaps the 
most important, is then whose responsibility it is to provide or discern such information, 
that is, if there is a duty to search for such information oneself or if there exists a right to 
be provided such information. In summary, the ethical acceptability of risk taking or risk 
exposure depends on good answers to such questions. The most promising response is to 
                                                 
39 See for a further elaboration Rath, 2008, pp 112-141 
40 Cf as an explanation: “…informed consent is a legal procedure to ensure that a patient or client knows 
all of the risks and costs involved in a treatment. The elements of informed consent include informing the 
client of the nature of the treatment, possible alternative treatments, and the potential risks and benefits of 
the treatment. In order for informed consent to be considered valid, the client must be competent and the 
consent should be given voluntarily…” (http://psychology.about.com/od/iindex/g/def_informedcon.htm).  
41 Cf as an example from the business ethics textbook literature DeGeorge, 2006, with a four-step risk 
information checklist on p. 280 
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use these questions as an agenda for risk communication, that is transferring, exchanging 
and sharing risk related information among all parties involved. In a risk ethical 
perspective, discourse ethics and risk dialogue among stakeholders represent a 
promising framework for both using and integrating the criteria and elements mentioned 
so far, not least if facts and/or criteria are controversial (cf Renn, 2008, pp. 151-154). 
The philosophical basis of discourse ethics is usually identified with the work of 
Jürgen Habermas,42 and with ethical judgements and standpoints as products of a 
discourse procedure guided by idealistic assumptions and rules, such as publicity 
(openness to all parties affected), equality (all participants have a potential to contribute 
to a good solution), sincerity (no strategic use of arguments), freedom (no internal nor 
external coercion) and not least that the best argument wins (i.e. the best for reaching a 
truly common-interest consensus, cf. Nyeng, 1999, p.100). As a theory, discourse ethics 
can build on and transcend other more or less classical ethical approaches, such as 
deontology, utilitarianism, justice, care and virtue ethics, by inviting these approaches to 
share and test their key arguments in a discourse setting where affected parties examine 
their own cases and look for the deepest possible consensus or at least for a sufficient 
consensus. In practice, discourse ethics as an ideal can inspire moral conflict 
management and consensus-building, for example among real business life parties and 
decision makers.43 The suggestion is that it is not any ethical authorities or experts, but 
the affected stakeholders themselves in a moral conflict situation, who should work out, 
develop and own the rightness of a moral standpoint and of a solution to a conflict. Or, 
in still other words, the rightness of a standpoint and a solution to a moral conflict is a 
function of the quality of the consensus brought about by good communication 
processes. Obviously, such stakeholders and such discourses can put moral conflicts 
about risk definition, risk evaluation, risk acceptability and tolerability or risk sharing on 
the agenda for open and fair consensus-building (cf. Renn, 2008, esp. pp. 201-271, 
Jungermann et al., 1990, or in an applied perspective http://www.risiko-
dialog.ch/Overview%20in%20English ). 
 
Risk and responsibility awareness as a character trait 
Decision-making in risky situations where responsibility (as a relation and as an 
obligation) is tested can be seen as a function of good ethical criteria or of good 
communication among affected parties or stakeholders (such as in the introductory cave 
rescue or in indecent proposal situations). However, instead of focusing on decisions in 
risky situations one can look at actors across risky situations and at responsibility as a 
positive personal trait (cf the reliability and trustworthiness synonyms of responsibility 
mentioned above, also the remarks about leadership and about Max Weber’s responsible 
politicians).  Inspired by a virtue ethical perspective and in the context of this paper one 
                                                 
42 See as the primary source still Habermas, 1983, pp. 53-125 (Engl. translation 1991, Moral 
Consciousness and Communicative Action, MIT Press) and perhaps J. Habermas, 1990. Among many 
secondary sources cf e.g. Stansbury, 2009, Beschorner, 2006, Steinmann and Löhr, 1994, pp 76-93, D. 
Matten, Moral im Unternehmen: Philosophische Zierleiste oder knappe Resorce?, in Haupt and 
Lachmann, 1998,  pp 11-33 
43 See e.g. Noland and Phillips, 2010 or in German for a nice overview Matten, 1998, e.g. p. 17 or, widely 
quoted, Steinmann and Löhr, 1994.  
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could suggest as an ideal criterion an ethical character that integrates risk and 
responsibility awareness. In other words, such integration could be something like a 
wise balance between taking too much and too little risk,44 between taking too much and 
too little responsibility, and perhaps also between taking and sharing responsibility.45 
 
Postscript: Balancing normative and descriptive risk ethics? 
In the beginning of this section a remark was made about potential risks related to 
normative connotations of risk, of attributions and evaluations. What if one wanted to 
accept the importance and legitimacy of a moral question, but without necessarily being 
sure that there is, can be or should be a normative, general or even rational answer? An 
example of such sceptical risk ethical46 questioning can be found in a paper by the late 
German sociologist Niklas Luhmann, about ”the morality of risk and the risk of 
morality”.47 Luhmann’s main advice seems to be that one should make sure that a 
normative focus on risk issues does not further prejudice instead of good judgment. 
Also, one should make sure that such a focus does not replace humbleness and good 
questions with premature answers. A constructive way of listening to Luhmann’s 
scepticism towards too much normative ethics too early could involve an equal 
interdisciplinary partnership of normative and descriptive ethics,48 of philosophy, 
critical-empirical social science, and technological risk research. Hopefully, such 
partnerships invite and deliver careful listening to one another and learning from one 
another, and further a more holistic understanding which internalizes legitimate 
stakeholder criticism as an essential ingredient of risk governance.  
 
                                                 
44 Cf the Aristotelian virtue of courage between the extremes or vices of rashness and cowardice. As good 
overviews cf. e.g. the Stanford Encyclopedia article http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/ by R. 
Hursthouse or the virtue ethics article by N. Athanassoulis in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , 
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/v/virtue.htm  In the business ethics tradition see various works of R.C. 
Solomon and e.g. Dobson, 2007. 
45 There is only space here to mention interesting next steps, in particular perhaps drafting a virtue ethical 
approach to risk and responsibility (cf Athanassoulis and Ross, 2010, esp. pp. 222-224) and developing 
instruments for empirical attitude measurement, of risk awareness, responsibility awareness, risk seeking, 
risk aversion etc and then developing typologies of attitudes towards both risk and responsibility (see 
Brinkmann and Aarset, 2012). A more qualitative way of researching in the overlap between discourse 
and virtue ethics could be staging a Socratic dialogue, using the design suggested by the practical 
philosopher’s movement (see e.g. http://www.sfcp.org.uk/socratic_dialogue.htm ; see also Brinkmann, 
2012, with a summary of a Socratic dialogue about “Taking risks responsibly”). 
46 Skeptical ethics is meant as a wider alternative label instead of e.g. postmodern ethics, see e.g. 
Gustafson, 2000. About moral skepticism cf. also Baggini and Fosl, 2007, pp. 235-237, with further 
references.  
47 Cf. as ”authentic” raw material for a discussion of Luhmann’s way of reasoning esp. Luhmann, 1993b, 
pp. 330-336: “If risks of some kind are ubiquitous and unavoidable, then one could postulate that the 
problem is not taking responsibility for risks but the likelihood of avoidable mistakes when deciding about 
risks…” or “Because morality can’t deal properly with risk as a problem it behaves risky itself” (by 
increasing the insult level of political communication, p. 332).  
48 Cf once more Crane and Matten, 2010, chapters 3 and 4 for a simple but pedagogically convincing 
presentation of normative and descriptive ethics as more equal partners than in most other introductory 
textbooks. 
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Risk and Responsibility: Illustration IV 
The COSO checklist which was briefly referred to above represents the essential 
“components” of enterprise risk management (ERM) which in the same source is 
defined as follows, as a: 
“… process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, 
applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events 
that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives…” (COSO, 2004, 
p. 8)49 
Consistently with our reasoning above, it looks as if an ERM design takes responsibility, 
at least ideally, by identifying, addressing and managing business risk and addresses 
responsibility as risk.50 In practice, ERM often boils down to rules of thumb such as 
“never take more risk than what you can take responsibility for” (e.g. equal equity for 
compensating any harmed stakeholders), or “limit your financial-legal responsibility to a 
low enough ceiling for encouraging entrepreneurial risk-taking.” Or skeptically one can 
ask to what extent risk management has a built-in self-destroying prophecy, and is risky 
in itself by pushing the limits for risk taking - either risks are larger and less predictable 
and less manageable than they look or management behaves rather riskily than carefully 
or responsibly and thus increases than decreases risk (and responsibility). 
Michael Power has raised questions of the third type and drafted answers to them 
(Power, 2004, cf. also Power, 2007), quoting Douglas and Wildavsky as a point of 
departure: “Can we know the risks we face, now or in the future? No, we cannot, but 
yes, we must act as if we do…” (2004, p. 9). Power’s diagnosis:  
“Risk management organises what cannot be organised, because individuals, 
corporations and governments have little choice but to do so. The risk management of 
everything holds out the promise of manageability in new areas. But it also implies a 
new way of allocating responsibility for decisions which must be made in potentially 
undecidable situations… The risk management of everything is characterised by the 
growth of risk management strategies that displace valuable – but vulnerable – 
professional judgement in favour of defendable process... (pp. 10-11). As a 
consequence, “experts who are being made increasingly accountable for what they do 
are now becoming more preoccupied with managing their own risks…” (p. 14), or in 
other words, “…expert judgement shrinks to an empty form of defendable 
compliance…” (p. 42).51 
                                                 
49 Cf. the following additional clarification (ibid.):”Enterprise risk management is: 
 A process, ongoing and flowing through an entity 
 Effected by people at every level of an organization 
 Applied in strategy setting 
 Applied across the enterprise, at every level and unit, and includes taking an entity level portfolio 
view of risk 
 Designed to identify potential events that, if they occur, will affect the entity and to manage risk 
within its risk appetite 
 Able to provide reasonable assurance to an entity’s management and board of directors 
 Geared to achievement of objectives in one or more separate but overlapping categories 
50As a test one could try to replace risk with responsibility in quotations, or with risk-and-responsibility. 
51 Cf also John Boatright’s two papers (2010, 2011) which both use Power’s thoughts (2004) as a point of 
departure for examining financial risk management ethics and the underexploited potential synergies 
between ERM and CSR.  
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Power’s suggested therapy reads like this: “… [The] … challenge is to … create a 
legitimate, ‘safe haven’ for the judgement of the individual within an ‘intelligent’ risk 
management capable of confronting complex systems which may be out of control…” 
(p. 50). Such intelligent risk management is then formulated in three points: “(1) “…[it] 
would not allow control systems, and their advocates, to swamp managerial attention 
and independent critical imagination”, (2) ”… a greater degree of disorganisation and 
ambiguity would be acceptable in risk management processes… [which instead, present 
author’s add.] … would be characterized more by learning and experiment, rather than 
rule-based processes”, but (3) “intelligent risk management will not throw the baby out 
with the bath water; not all process and internal control is bad. To the extent that process 
represents the codification of accumulated wisdom, it should be sustained subject to the 
possibility of constant challenge.” (p. 61). 
 
A parallel therapy consists in the limiting of what Power calls secondary risk 
management (perhaps the most thought-provoking concept in the source, with derived 
and compensatory reputational risk as the primary example):52  
 
(1) “…explicitly acknowledge that risks are ‘selected’ by institutions for a mixture of 
cultural and economic reasons”, (2) “… generate legitimacy for the possibility of 
failure”, (3) “…imagine and create ‘safe havens’ for professional and expert 
judgement”, (4) ”… challenge the ‘small print‘ or disclaimer society… In the interests of 
transparency, small print should be made large and ruled out as a secondary risk 
management ploy” (pp. 62-64).53 
 
Risk and Responsibility: (A Final) Illustration V 
In the introduction to this paper, insurance was mentioned as an inspiring ideal-typical 
construction of sustainable risk and responsibility sharing in well-designed pools, within 
clear and well-known limits to coverage, maximizing the greatest economic security and 
care, for the greatest number, at the best possible prices. So far the relationship between 
risk and responsibility has been addressed as a theoretical challenge - for conceptual 
clarification, for development of appropriate procedures with more or less grounding in 
normative (or descriptive) ethics research.  For the insurance business, risk and 
responsibility represent a practical challenge - given insurance systems are risk transfer 
and mitigation systems which need to be responsible by being sustainable, which need 
protection against self-destruction from inside or outside, from what one could call 
irresponsible risks and risks of irresponsibility (or moral hazard, more usually).54 In 
                                                 
52 In his 2004 book, Power offers two illuminating examples related to secondary risk which is essentially 
responsibility aversion rather than risk aversion (cf. p. 45): insignificant CEO parking fines are paid as 
reputational risk management (p. 32) or school trips are evaluated in terms of liability risks (pp. 42, 45)  
53 A fifth kind of solution formulated by Power is the following (abbreviated): “given the significance of 
large organisations in economic and public life, the elements of a new politics of uncertainty could be 
assembled at this level of society and filter ‘upwards’ into the political domain, just as other ideas have 
done…” (2004, p. 65) 
54 About moral hazard equal insurance abuse among consumers see e.g. Brinkmann and Lentz, 2006 or 
Lesch and Brinkmann, 2011, with further references. 
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other words, it is suggested here that insurance arrangements represent an almost ideal 
combination of risk and responsibility (BI forsikring, 2005, p. 17, author’s translation):  
Insurance is an arrangement for compensation of economic losses suffered by an 
individual, where the losses are a consequence of random and unforeseen events. 
Insurance functions as a safety net for each of us where losses hitting a few only are 
shared among a large number of individuals in a group… An insurance arrangement is 
built on a number of basic principles: 
 
• A group joins 
• Losses must be unforeseen 
• The risk threatens all group members 
• The group needs to have a certain minimum size and a loss must be able to reach a 
significant size 
• The insurance customers can’t produce a covered loss themselves 
• The loss risk must be measurable (likelihood and size) 
• The loss can be expressed in terms of money...” (ibid., p. 23) 
 
A short reference to liability insurance for car owners can serve as an example.55 The 
risk pool (or ‘group’ in the above quote) consists of a sufficient number of car-owners 
facing the same type of risk and being covered by the same insurance, for future 
unforeseen but measurable losses, expressed and compensated in money terms. The fine 
print of the insurance contract informs us, however, that rather than risky car use as 
such, only risky and responsible car use is covered (while irresponsible car use risks the 
insurance coverage). There are often various legal limitations, such as responsibility for 
outdated and under-specified events, judged by lawyers rather than laypersons, perhaps 
with equal responsibility and guilt sharing among drivers and their insurance and with 
deductibles as a design for risk and responsibility sharing.56 
                                                 
55 Cf Brinkmann and Aarset, 2012, with a discussion of findings from a survey among Norwegian car 
liability insurance customers. A less familiar but better illustration than liability insurance for car 
owners would have been so-called microinsurance. Cf. for an introductory presentation 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microinsurance (abridged by by present author): “Micro-insurance is 
insurance with low premiums and low caps / coverage..., a financial arrangement to protect low-
income people against specific perils in exchange for regular premium payments proportionate to the 
likelihood and cost of the risk involved…, (often) synonymous to community-based financing 
arrangements…, the use of insurance as an economic instrument at (the smaller than national) level of 
society…” For a much broader and deeper presentation see two microinsurance compendia (Churchill, 
2006; Churchill snd Matula, 2012). In his introductory chapter, Churchill describes seven key 
characteristics of microinsurance for the poor which make it typically different from “conventional 
insurance” and from “mainstream social-protection programmes”: 1) Relevant to the risks of low-
income households, 2) As inclusive as possible, 3) Affordable premiums , 4) Grouping for efficiencies, 
5) Clearly defined and simple rules and restrictions , 6) Easily accessible claims documentation 
requirements and 7) Strategies to overcome the wariness of customers: “…Microinsurance can be 
described as an insurance ‘back to basics’ campaign, to focus on the risk-management needs of 
vulnerable people, and to help them manage those risks through the solidarity of risk pooling…” (pp. 
22-24). In addition see not least SwissRe, 2010 or e.g. Brinkmann and Tak (2011), or Radermacher and 
Brinkmann, 2011, more specifically addressing the microinsurance business ethics 
56 See also Munich Re, 2007. Insurance arrangements and insurance as a societal institution are principally 
interesting, beyond such examples, as a mix of complementary and in part contradictory elements, such as 
cognitive and normative expectations, between actuarial and legal paradigms - cf. Brinkmann and Lentz, 
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For more development of these themes, the reader might examine Francois Ewald’s 
(1991) description of insurance as a technology of risk 57 and two of Tom Baker’s works 
(2000, 2002). In his article about “Insuring Morality” (2000) Baker presents a 
responsibility versus a risk paradigm for how the insurance business can handle its 
heterogeneous customers, the “good” ones and the “bad” ones (2000).58 The second 
article discusses insurance as an institutionalized combination of risk and responsibility, 
as an organizer of responsibility for risk in society. It feels tempting to use Baker’s 
formulations for concluding this section (2002, pp. 47-48): 
“… Insurance is a form of social responsibility and … insurance institutions shape 
responsibility in five analytically distinct senses of that term – accountability, 
trustworthiness, causation, freedom, and solidarity. Insurance shapes accountability 
through decisions about premiums and benefits, through subrogation and coordination of 
benefits, and through risk-management techniques designed to reduce the exposure of 
insurance institutions to loss. Insurance shapes trustworthiness through decisions about 
whom to insure, what premiums to charge, and whose claims to pay, as well as through 
risk-management techniques designed to foster responsible behavior. Insurance shapes 
causation through decisions about whose claims to pay and what kinds of benefits will 
be offered to cover what kinds of events, and, once again, through risk-management 
techniques that identify who or what causes loss in order to minimize losses in the 
future. Insurance shapes freedom through many of the efforts to control moral hazard. 
Finally, insurance shapes solidarity through decisions about risk classification and 
underwriting, and through risk-management techniques that alter the structure of 
organizations. Seen in this way, insurance institutions cease to play only a passive, loss-
spreading role and, instead, actively construct (and are constructed by) the world they 
inhabit…” 
                                                                                                                                                
2006, using cognitive versus normative expectations as elements for a micro-sociological understanding 
(p. 179), and for a meso-level understanding of the insurance business, as a mix of paradigms, referring 
extensively to Baker’s literature review article Insuring morality (2000). Cf. also the anthology of Ericson 
and Doyle, 2003, with various articles addressing the same topic. As a point of departure for a risk and 
responsibility sharing perspective cf. Brinkmann 2007, pp. 96-10, where responsibility sharing in 
insurance contexts is illustrated and discussed from three angles – as pseudo-sharing, as a question of 
relative sovereignty of the parties and as conditional responsibility sharing. 
57 Ewald’s thoughts and formulations can be put into a thesis format: 
 ”The term ’risk’… has no precise meaning other than as a category of (insurance) technology…” (p. 
198) 
 In insurance contexts, risk ”designates… a specific mode of treatment of certain events capable of 
happening to a group of individuals…” (p. 199) 
 Risk in the meaning of insurance has three great characteristics: it is calculable, it is collective, and it 
is capital…” (p. 201) 
 Insurance (can be defined as) ”the compensation of effects of chance through mutuality organised 
according to laws of statistics…” (p. 205) 
 Insurance is ”an economic and financial technique, a moral technology, a technique of reparation and 
indemnification of damages…” (pp. 206-207) 
 ”Societies enter modernity once insurance becomes societal and once the societal contract takes the 
shape of an insurance contract. Insurance constitutes the very core of modern societies” (p. 288) 
”In reality, there are no risks, but everything can become a risk, depending on how dangers are analysed 
and events are observed…” (p. 295) 
58 The more old-fashioned responsibility paradigm focuses on  “moralized personal attributes and 
pressures like ‘temptation’ and ‘character’” while the more modern one focuses on ‘system efficiency’” 
(Baker, 2000, p. 559).  
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An Open Ending: Next Steps? 
In its title, this paper promised to suggest first steps. To fulfill this promise, the paper 
has offered conceptual clarification, checklists and risk ethical perspectives as these first 
steps, together with illustrations. It makes sense to conclude the paper with an open 
ending, with some suggestions of possible next steps.59 
 
Next step: Going empirical? 
Risk and responsibility awareness have been presented and discussed above as desirable 
character traits of a decision-maker, with virtue ethics as a primary reference. But one 
could also take the step from normative to descriptive risk ethics and look for good 
qualitative or standardized ways of mapping such awareness,60 and then even ask how 
risk and responsibility (as awarenesses) are combined empirically – for example, if and 
how they are correlated, if they represent one common or two distinct dimensions, and 
in the latter case, if a simple typology could be helpful, as in the following matrix table: 
 
 Responsibility avoidance Responsibility acceptance 
Risk acceptance Carelessness Courage 
Risk avoidance Cowardice Cautiousness 
Exhibit #4: Four types of risk and responsibility awareness 
 
Next step: Going practical? 
Health, Safety and Environment (HSE)-related risks are among the primary “practical” 
responsibilities of business, towards employees and towards the natural environment. In 
Scandinavia (and in many other countries, but not in all countries across the globe), 
HSE-responsibilities are highly regulated by legal norms, which typically ascribe both 
ex ante and ex post responsibilities and which typically focus on specified 
responsibilities at the expense of vague responsibility (cf 
http://www.arbeidstilsynet.no/binfil/download2.php?tid=77839 ). Even if employers are 
legally responsible for developing a risk management routine, so-called “internal 
control” systems, a next step could be to ask more or less critically and more or less 
empirically if such a legal compliance focus can have unintended and undesirable side 
                                                 
59 Obviously, in addition to a possible extension and further elaboration of illustrations III to V above 
60 Cf once more Brinkmann and Aarset, 2012. As a pretest for this study (and as an introduction to our 
course in risk management and governance) a few instruments were tried out among the course 
participants. Risk awareness was measured with B. Rohrmann’s tools (RSQ, RPQ, ROQ, see 
http://www.rohrmannresearch.net/pdfs/rohrmann-racreport.pdf , while responsibility for the time being 
was measured with Rokeach’s terminal and instrumental values lists (see: 
http://www.google.no/search?sourceid=navclient&aq=0&oq=rokea&ie=UTF-
8&rlz=1T4SKPB_enNO380NO380&q=rokeach+value+survey. After some major revision a survey 
among insurance customers is planned, most likely for using different combinations of risk and 
responsibility awareness as point of departure for a cluster analysis.  
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effects of responsibility avoidance, of furthering secondary rather than primary risk 
awareness and risk management (cf. once more Power, 2004, pp. 62-64, also pp. 24-
28).61 
Next step: Financial risk management? 
A few months after an earlier version of this manuscript had been used for a lecture, the 
financial crisis developed as the global financial markets became self-destructive (as a 
consequence of bad housing loan risks which increasingly infected the whole investment 
banking system which had traded and transferred these bad risks as CDOs and CDSs).62 
This served as a reminder that crises often are signs, of interacting systemic risks rather 
than independent risks, and of missing or falsified risk management.63 Meanwhile, John 
Boatright has in two papers examined and discussed the limitations to and the ethics of 
financial risk management, which neither predicted nor prevented such extra large 
financial system risks but instead had a primary co-responsibility for the crisis by 
creating a false sense of security (2010, 2011). 
 
Next step: Positioning within our discipline? 
Sooner or later, one should also discuss how to position risk and responsibility 
perspectives within business ethics as a research and teaching discipline (including its 
close academic relatives). Schwartz and Carroll have tried to “integrate and unify 
competing and complementary frameworks” for the “proper role of business in society” 
and to search for a “common core” (2008). As part of such a project, the authors suggest 
combining three “core concepts”, value, balance and accountability, to a “VBA-model”, 
as a common denominator across CSR, business ethics, stakeholder management, 
sustainability and corporate citizenship “frameworks” (cf as a summary visualization 
their figure on p. 149). If one’s intention is to examine the potential of a risk and 
responsibility perspective as an indispensable dimension across the research territory of 
business and society one should at least try to relate it to the Schwartz and Carroll 
proposal. A risk-and-responsibility perspective could inspire “value creation” (as risky), 
“accountability” (as both a consequence and as a source of risk) and “balancing” 
(especially  between risk and responsibility). Furthermore one could discuss if the very 
core reference, the “proper role of business in society”, would be better understood if 
one emphasized the risky nature of business and its societal role, and to what extent such 
risks are inherited from or interacting with society as risk society in the sense of Beck 
and Giddens.  
 
                                                 
61 An example could be properly collected and analyzed burnout risk data among university teaching and 
research faculty, with coaching, sabbatical and early retirement schemes as main risk control mechanisms. 
Even with a legal HSE-responsibility, of management together with employee representatives, to prevent 
burnout there exists a complex sharing of organizational culture level and individual level risks and 
responsibilities, with golden means of leadership, faculty self-management, work flexibility (cf. Sennett, 
1998), eventually work-life balance.  
62 Collateralized debt obligations (i.e. bundled loan risks) and credit default swaps (i.e. insured then 
against bankruptcy).  
63 Cf two inspiring references instead of many, a Caux round table comment and a NYT article about risk 
mismanagement: http://cauxroundtable.blogspot.com/2008/10/global-prosperity-at-risk-current.html and 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html?_r=3&scp=1&sq=nocera%20risk&st=cse ) 
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